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I. Introduction 
 
Religious extremism is as old as religion itself, but the tendency to promote militancy and 
terrorism from within extremist religions appears to be much more common now than in 
times past (Juergensmeyer 2001; Stern 2003; Wiktorowicz 2005).
1
 Today’s terrorists 
routinely frame their objectives in religious terms and organize their activities within 
religious movements. This shift is not due to increased militancy within religion as a 
whole, nor even within the stricter subset of religious groups commonly labeled 
“sectarian” or “fundamentalist” (Marty and Appleby 1995; Bromley and Melton 2002). 
Rather, groups with militant objectives are increasingly leveraging the latent potential for 
violence within extremist religion. Krueger and Maleckova (2003; 2007) have shown 
that, contrary to popular hypotheses regarding the salience of poverty and education, it is 
instead institutional conditions such as civil liberties that contribute to the origination of 
terrorists within a country. Religious extremism has been connected to terrorism, which 
has been connected to civil liberties. We seek to complete the triangle and connect 
religious extremism to social conditions, both theoretically and empirically, with an eye 
towards civil liberties.  
This paper extends previous models of religious clubs to better account for 
observed patterns of extremism across different settings and test policies most likely to 
                                                 
1 Following the work of contemporary sociologists and economists of religion, this paper defines religious 
extremism in terms of the high costs that a religious group imposes upon its members, especially those costs 
that arise due to deviant norms of conduct that limit the opportunities of members. Religious extremism 
cannot be defined apart from its social context. Greater extremism means greater difference, separation, and 
antagonism relative to the broader society and dominant culture. For more on this approach to extremism, see 
(Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Iannaccone 1999; Berman 2000; Stark and Finke 2000) 
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reduce the appeal of extremism. Economists, at first blush, should have trouble 
explaining the survival of groups that demand large sacrifices from their members. 
Successful religious groups, however, routinely impose all sorts of apparently 
unproductive costs on their members. Iannaccone (1992) introduced a formal model of 
religious clubs within which apparently irrational “sacrifice and stigma” enhances the 
individual and collective utility. His model demonstrated the feasibility of extremist 
groups, but does less to explain the relative prevalence of extremism across time and 
place. Further, the original model allows for only corner solutions, and as such, the 
viability of extreme groups is indistinguishable from the viability of the more moderate 
groups they must compete with for members in the religious marketplace.  
In Section II we revisit, analyze, and extend the club model of religion. We push 
the analysis of the original model, exploring sacrifice, substitutability of club and private 
goods, and their relationships to member commitment and the viability of extremist 
groups. In this preliminary analysis, we illustrate both the potential insights of the club 
theory of religion into the strength and viability of extremist groups, but also the 
limitations inherent to the representative agent model.  We proceed by extending the 
model in a multi-agent, computational framework. This framework permits us to analyze 
the distributions of agents and clubs that make up a religious economy. The 
computational nature of the model is critical because it allows for sufficient heterogeneity 
of agents and clubs, and given this heterogeneity, agent decision-making absent closed 
form solutions via Nash equilibria. Extremists groups emerge as just one segment (the 
high-cost tail) of a distribution of religious clubs that range across the full spectrum of 
potential (group-imposed) sacrifice and stigma. Extremism is identifiable and comparable 
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in the model because it exists within a full spectrum of clubs. By varying the parameters 
of the model that control the distribution of (secular) wages across agents and the degree 
of substitutability between religious and secular commodities, we can better explain 
where and when religious extremism is most popular, its strength relative to more 
moderate groups, and which economic policies reduce its prevalence. 
Although popular discourse tends to equate religious extremism and religious 
militancy, we must keep in mind that the vast majority of deviant religious groups have 
no history of violence (Iannaccone 1997). This paper uses the term “extremism” in the 
way it is now used by most sociologists and economists of religion. An “extremist” group 
requires its members to behave in ways that are very costly but not directly productive. 
Typical examples include restrictions on dress, diet, sexual conduct, and social 
interactions that limit opportunities or stigmatize members. Such groups also routinely 
insist that members contribute a great deal of their time and money to the group, most of 
which is not employed in ways that yield much marketable output. Hence, the costs and 
sacrifices in question are not mere transfers of resources from individual members to 
leaders or to the group as a whole. 
 The membership potential, as a fraction of the greater population, of groups 
demanding extreme levels of sacrifice on behalf its members remains unexplored. In 
representative agent models, which implement sacrifice as an increasing shadow price of 
secular goods, only two types of groups are viable: those requiring complete sacrifice 
(complete prohibition of secular goods) and those requiring zero sacrifice (full access to 
secular goods as priced by the market). A deeper understanding of group strength along a 
sacrifice spectrum necessitates the use of a distribution of agent wages. The multi-agent 
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extension of the model allows agent wages to be randomly drawn from a generated 
probability distribution. The strength of any group type is measurable both relative to the 
sizes of other groups and as a fraction of the total population. Using the model, we can 
test the viability of extremism in the religious profile of a population of agents under 
different wage and substitutability regimes, where substitutability is the elasticity of 
substitution between the club good and secular goods. As a real world analogue, 
substitutability correlates with the ability of the group to produce goods internally that are 
substitutable for goods available in the private marketplace, via outside social networks, 
or provided publicly by government.  Empirical research has established the 
substitutability of religious activity for both market (Gruber and Hungerman 2006) and 
state provided goods (Hungerman 2005). 
We are constructing a model of extremism, and not terrorism. That said, our 
model is relevant to discussions of terrorist groups. As Berman (2004) has emphasized, 
costly religious extremism yields groups whose social characteristics (such as unusually 
high levels of mutual commitment) give them a comparative advantage in the production 
of terrorism relative to secular groups and mainstream religious groups.  The key feature 
of Iannaccone’s model is that sacrifice can mitigate free rider problems and thereby boost 
the production of club goods – including such goods as social capital, loyalty, and 
commitment. Sacrifice deters the entry of less committed members while also raising 
levels of involvement among those who do join the group. The net result is a social unit 
well suited to costly, high-risk activities (Iannaccone and Berman 2006). The more 
sacrifice a group can demand, the greater its potential capacity to sustain militant 
subgroups. 
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In our multi-agent model, substitutability is the key parameter governing model 
outcomes. For extremist groups to thrive, relatively lower wages are necessary
2
, but not 
sufficient. Strong substitutability, however, is found to be necessary and weakly 
sufficient. Quantile regression analysis of simulation data generated by the model shows 
the agent response to substitutability changing from negative to positive as we move to 
the upper quantiles of the agent commitment distribution. When substitutability increases, 
the median agent reduces her commitment of resources to her club. The most committed 
agents in the population, however, respond in the opposite manner and commit more 
resources to their clubs as substitutability increases. Extremist groups, as such, will be 
more successful when they can provide a strong substitute for secular goods. Further, a 
simple extension of the multi-agent model finds that a publicly provided good similar to 
the club goods provided by organizations reduces the popularity of extremist groups 
within the simulated religious economy.  
Quantile regression of religious commitment data from the 1998 International 
Social Survey Program results produces a negative to positive pattern of rising 
coefficients on civil liberties across quantiles similar to what is found in the regression 
analysis of the simulation data. This result holds when controlling for economic freedom 
and the quality of government produced public goods. The differential response to civil 
liberties across the commitment spectrum, specifically the increasing of religious 
commitment with weakening civil liberties at the extreme end of the commitment 
distribution, supports Krueger and Maleckova’s (2003) work linking terrorist origination 
to weak civil liberties. The model offers a club mechanism within which the success of 
                                                 
2 Necessary here meaning that population wages can be raised to levels, however unrealistic, at which 
extreme religion is suboptimal for even the poorest agents in the population, regardless of circumstance.   
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terrorist and extreme religious groups would correlate to civil liberties in a similar 
manner.  
 
II.  Modeling Religious Groups 
 
The economic theory of clubs has been used to study a variety of social phenomena 
(Buchanan 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1986). Within the economic study of religion, the 
club model has arguably been the most successful and frequently employed. Iannaccone’s 
(1992) model of groups that require  unproductive costs, termed “sacrifice and stigma,” 
on the behalf of  rational, utility-maximizing members is the foundation of this literature. 
The original model was influential for its ability to explain seemingly irrational behavior 
on behalf of voluntary members of prohibitive, highly stigmatized religious groups.  It is 
noteworthy that there is nothing uniquely religious in the construction. It does not employ 
any supernatural considerations, and is applicable to secular groups notable for their 
sacrifice and stigma requirements, such as military units or college fraternities. It 
remains, however, that club theory, and sacrifice and stigma specifically, has proven 
itself repeatedly as an effective and useful means of modeling religious congregations 
and the social phenomena associated with them.  
In this section we revisit the original representative agent model and analyze some 
of its parameter relationships in greater depth than previous works before moving on to 
the multi-agent model. We construct the multi-agent computational model with 
mathematical underpinnings explicitly based on Iannaccone’s original model. All 
changes made to the model serve to adapt the original, relatively austere, representative 
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agent model to accommodate a population of heterogeneous agents operating with local 
interactions across discrete units of time. Adapting the original model in this manner 
allows us to test the implications of the club model of religion for an entire religious 
economy and observe the macro properties emergent within the population.  
Agent utility production relies on secular and religious inputs, which are 
themselves produced by the agent using inputs of time and money. Time endowments are 
homogenous across agents, while money is a function of wages which are heterogeneous 
across the population. What makes the production of the religious input unique is the 
interdependence of religious production with other members of the group. This 
interdependence invites members to free ride – to be a member of the group and benefit 
from the religious production of other members while in turn neglecting her own 
religious production. Iannaccone’s crucial insight was that the imposition of costly 
sacrifice and stigma requirements can mitigate the free rider problem, resulting in rational 
members whose choose to reduce their secular productive capacity and, in turn, to engage 
in more religious production increases not just their own utility, but the utility of all other 
members.  
 
The Representative Agent Model 
In our model, as in Iannaccone’s, utility is produced with a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production function, with inputs of a secular, private good S, and a 
religious, club good K, preference parameters dS and dK , and a substitution parameter β. S 
and K are here classic “Z-good” arguments in the utility function (Stigler and Becker 
1977). K is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to 
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scale, with inputs of Ri, the individual’s contribution, and gQ , the “quality” of the other 
group members’ contributions, with output elasticity parameters α and 1- α. 
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The group quality input, 
,i gQ  is defined as a function of the average input R 
across agent i’s neighbors, j i , a scalar s > 0, and the number of agent i’s neighbors,
gn , 
that are members of the group, g, being evaluated. Here the original representative agent 
model hinges on a Nash-Equilibrium assumption (  j i iR R  ), creating a prisoner’s 
dilemma.  S and R, are both Cobb-Douglas produced with inputs of goods, xS and xR 
(prices pS and pR); and time vS and vR; input elasticity parameters a and b; and production 
capacity parameters AS and AR. AS is the dimension in which group sacrifice is 
implemented.  
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Agent’s are exogenously endowed with a heterogeneous wage rate, wi, and a uniform 
time endowment 
, ,i S i RV v v  . Using the envelope theorem, we can construct shadow 
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prices πR and πS.
3
 With agent specific shadow prices established, agent choice is an 
exercise in standard optimization constrained by the agents exogenously endowed full 
income 
, , , ,( ) ( )S i S R i R i i S i i R ip x p x wv wv I     (Becker 1965), defined as the value of 
goods purchased and wages forgone to time invested. 
From this Iannaccone (1992) derives Marshallian demands ( , 
e eR S ) with standard 
optimization.
4
 Using these derived demands and shadow prices, and fixing several model 
parameters (w = 2; α = 0.3; a = 0.7; b = 0.3)5 we can numerically explore the model 
beyond where Iannaccone left off. In Figure 1 we observe the U-shaped response curve 
of equilibrium agent utility over the secular productivity parameter AS, where lower 
values of AS correspond to greater sacrifice requirements. We include in Figure 1 the 
curves for differing values of β. The U-shape offers up two immediate properties. First, 
we can see Iannaccone’s principal finding - the possibility of greater sacrifice (lower AS) 
as the utility maximizing choice.  Second, however, we take note that the utility 
optimizing choice is always one of the two corner solutions, where AS is either zero 
(wherein agents choose to completely sacrifice all secular productivity) or one (wherein 
agent’s do not sacrifice any productivity). This is not a concern in Iannaccone’s paper, 
which serves as an existence proof of the possibility of utility enhancing sacrifice. In 
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5 These parameters are identical to those used by Iannaccone (1992) and are discussed in greater detail in 
the next section. The wage parameter is chosen in part for ease of visual depiction.  
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seeking to analyze extremist religion, however, this poses a greater problem. If only 
complete sacrifice is utility maximizing, then all successful religious clubs are extremist. 
Here we see the first limitation of the representative agent model. Extremism is a relative 
concept and is analytically tractable only when the model entails a wider spectrum of 
agent behavior and group sacrifice demands.  
A third property within the representative agent model is observed by varying the 
substitutability (β) parameter. The shape of the response curve to AS varies with β, 
flattening out with lower values. In Figure 1, with wages fixed we observe three different 
curves for three different values of β. The optimal corner solution varies with β. An agent 
with a given wage may choose very different clubs under different substitutability 
regimes. Under the current parameterization, we can see the “complete sacrifice” corner 
solution preferable under higher regimes of greater substitutability (β = 0.9, 0.75), and the 
“no sacrifice” solution preferable under weaker substitutability regimes (β = 0.6).  We 
can infer from this finding that the recruiting success of clubs requiring complete 
sacrifice is increasing with greater substitutability of club goods for privately produced 
goods. Conversely, clubs requiring no sacrifice would be more successful in weak 
substitutability environments. Inferences regarding the impact on clubs occupying the 
intermediate are inconclusive.   
 
[FIGURE 1] 
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We also want to know the impact of substitutability on agent contributions 
(commitment) to the group.  It is only interesting, however, in the intermediate range of 
sacrifice. When clubs require complete sacrifice (AS = 0), agents will contribute their 
entire full income to club production, regardless of substitutability. When clubs require 
zero sacrifice (AS = 1), agents will easy-ride and contribute minimally to club production, 
with less regard to substitutability. It is only in the intermediate range that substitutability 
is potentially of interest. This is, again, problematic within the representative agent 
model, where only corner solutions are utility maximizing. For the moment it is useful to 
impose values of AS exogenously, and observe the changing optimal contributions of 
agents.  Using the same fixed parameters as earlier, Figure 2 shows the difference in 
equilibrium response to substitutability between clubs which allow secular productivity 
rates of AS = 0.1 (90% sacrifice) and AS = 0.9 (10% sacrifice). We observe sharply 
divergent responses to increasing rates of substitutability. The agents in the low sacrifice 
club are contributing less of their full income to group production as substitutability 
increases, while agents in the high sacrifice club are contributing more as substitutability 
increases.  
[FIGURE 2] 
 
 We can infer from the relationships observed in Figures 1 and 2 that groups 
requiring extreme levels of sacrifice on behalf of members will be able to recruit a greater 
number of members and receive greater commitment of resources to the group by 
members as club goods become a stronger substitute for privately produced goods.  Such 
inferences regarding extremist groups, however, are tenuous at best in a model in which 
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all successful groups are extremist and the only alternative to joining an extremist group 
is to join a zero-sacrifice group crippled by free riders. We have no way of judging in the 
representative agent model how extremist groups will fare when competing with 
moderate groups (which in the real world constitute the majority of religious groups) or 
how they will respond to model parameters when they themselves are employing 
sacrifice requirements less than 100%.  
 
The Multi-Agent Computational Model 
To explore further the appeal of extremist groups and the commitment on behalf 
of their membership, we extend the model in a multi-agent (MA) computational context. 
The MA model retains all of the mathematical underpinnings of the original model 
except where explicitly noted. From these mathematical foundations, we extend the 
model in three key dimensions: population heterogeneity, time, and space. Specifically, 
the model is constructed with N heterogeneous agents, operating for T discrete time steps, 
on a two dimensional lattice (Figure 3), on which agents occupy spaces identified as 
“patches.” Agents are one to a patch, and have a set of eight neighboring patches whose 
occupants make up their “neighborhood.” 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
Agents are heterogeneous with respect to wage (w) and spatial location. As such, 
the original Nash Equilibrium assumption that   j i iR R   no longer necessarily holds 
true. In the MA model Qi,g is strictly increasing in ng, with diminishing marginal returns.  
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[2]  ,, (1 1/ (1 ))g j ii g gQ R s n     
This definition of Qi,g constitutes the most significant mathematical adaptation of the 
original model. Resultant of this adaptation the  model ceases to have a closed form 
equilibrium solution.
6
 In a computer-aided framework, however, we are less dependent 
on finding closed form solutions.
7
 The utility function, for any given value of Qi,g, is 
concave, containing only a global maximum. As such, we have the luxury of employing 
the relatively simple golden mean search optimization algorithm (Press 2002).  
In evaluating 
,i gQ , agent i is evaluating agents currently occupying patches in her 
neighborhood who are members of group   where G= 0,1,2...mg G . The groups in set 
G are differentiated along required member sacrifice in private productivity 
parameter g
SA , where:  
[3] 
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The sacrifice that a group enforces comes at the expense of g
SA , where the first group (g = 
0) offers members private productivity parameter 0
SA = 1 (no sacrifice) and the final group 
requires 1m
SA 
  (complete sacrifice, where ε is defined as an arbitrarily small value to 
prevent division by zero). The resultant sacrifice is1 gSA .
8
 
 
                                                 
6 The computational model generates outcomes equivalent to the Nash Equilibrium outcome of 
Iannaccone’s original model when constrained to a representative agent. The implied two-group outcome 
possibility can also be generated if two agent types are employed. 
7 The model is written in Java 1.5.1 using the MASON agent modeling library (Luke et al. 2005).  
8 Different bases were tested for the sacrifice function. As the number of groups is increased, the model 
becomes more fine grained, but at the cost of speed and ease of data collection and analysis. The formula 
employed allows for finer grained analysis at the lower end of the sacrifice spectrum and sufficient variety 
at the higher end, while limiting the model to what proved to be a tractable number of groups.     
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Model Steps 
 Agents in the model spend their time looking around at the other agents in their 
neighborhood and hypothesizing what it would be like to join each of their respective 
groups. The agent then joins whichever group, as it currently stands, offers the highest 
potential utility at that time step. After joining a group, the agent then chooses the 
investment of her time and goods that optimizes her utility. A run of the model consists 
of initialization followed by a set number of time steps, summarized in the following time 
structure: 
 Step (t = 0) Initialization. The model creates and places agents randomly, one 
per patch. Agents are heterogeneous across wages, pulling random values from a 
lognormal wage distribution. Agents are randomly assigned an initial group from a set of 
m different groups. Upon their creation, agents optimize their values of R and S as a 
function of their wage and the sacrifice required by their initial group in an iterated 
Cournot-Nash solution to a game that the agent plays against herself. This is the only 
time that agents act without knowledge of their neighbors.  
 Step (t > 0). Each model step consists of shuffling the order of agents and one at a 
time progressing through their ranks. When it is agent i’s turn, she will evaluate Qi,g for 
each prospective group, g, that is represented in her neighborhood.
9
 The optimal R and S 
are determined for each potential group, with the agent joining the utility maximizing 
group.  
The choice of group for an agent is a function of her wage, each group’s 
respective sacrifice demanded, the quantity and commitment (in terms of R) of the 
                                                 
9 The set of groups considered always includes the zero-sacrifice group, regardless of whether a member 
resides in the agent’s neighborhood. 
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representatives of each group in her neighborhood, which is in turn a function of their 
wages and the decisions made by their neighbors, and so forth. The actual emergent 
collection of groups is a problem of, perhaps, surprising complexity for a model rooted in 
a standard CES structure. Despite this complexity, relying on a relatively small number 
of structural assumptions allows for a manageable number of parameters to be tested for 
their impact on the emergent landscape of groups. 
 
Parameterization 
We fix several parameters of the model exogenously for both tractability and 
functionality. As demonstrated in Iannaccone’s original paper, substitutability (β) must be 
greater than the output elasticity of R (α) for the sacrifice mechanism to work. Similarly, 
the elasticities of demand for goods and time within the internal production functions for 
S and R must be different, with R weighted towards the time input, relative to S ( a b ). 
The differentiation of goods is intuitively understandable; if the two goods are 
indistinguishable, then the lower priced one will always be favored, and any sacrifice will 
cause the club to fail. If ()S and ()R employ inputs of goods and time differently, then the 
ratio of shadow prices depends on the agent’s full income and her opportunity cost of 
time. It is assumed that club production places greater emphasis on its members’ time 
than private production. Club goods require individual participation – absentia or proxy 
representation diminishes the good for both the agent and other group members.  
The dominant strands in the income distribution literature suggest the lognormal, 
gamma, and exponential as the probability distributions that best describe the United 
States and other industrialized nations (McDonald and Ransom 1979; Majumder and 
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Chakravarty 1990; Dragulescu and Yakovenko 2001). For its tractability of generation 
and greater empirical accuracy at the lower end of the distribution, the model employs a 
lognormal distribution of full incomes. The key shape parameter, standard deviation of 
log full income, is taken from the United States Census Bureau (Jones and Weinberg 
2000).  
Ceteris paribus, extremist group membership increases with greater returns to 
scale (s) in the production of the club good, but is not dependent on them. Members of 
extremist groups have a near complete dependence on the club good, and as returns to 
scale increase, so does the maximum utility the group can offer. None of the results 
discussed in this paper are dependent on a narrow parameterization of returns to scale. 
Sectarian groups with extremist demands will typically appeal only to a small subset of a 
population, at least early in its development, if not forever. Given these constraints on 
membership size, it is critical that the viability of extremist groups is not dependent on 
increasing, or even constant, returns to membership scale. Independence from scale is 
important given the military context that militant sectarian groups face. Organizations are 
often broken up into separate, self-sustaining cells whose objectives require small size. It 
is crucial that these clubs can thrive while membership is limited and exclusive.  
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III Simulation Results 
Fixed parameters are constant across all model realizations: s = 1.25, α = 0.3, a = 
0.7, b = 0.3, m = 60.
10
 Prices, preferences, and the log standard deviation of full income 
are all set equal to one. Substitutability, β, and mean full income, μ, are the key 
parameters tested. The experiment generating data for Figures 4 and 5 varies β in 
increments of 0.1, between 0.4 and 0.9, inclusive. Mean full income (μ) is varied in units 
of 8, between 8 and 64, inclusive. Each combination of β and μ is run 50 times, with 100 
turns constituting a run. In the course of a turn, each of the 1,089 agents is activated in 
random order. When an agent is activated, she surveys her Moore neighborhood
11
 and 
chooses the utility maximizing group.   
We categorize four groups, out of the sixty possible, as being extremist, requiring 
sacrifices of 100%, 90%, 81%, and 73% of productive capacity.
12
 We chart results for  
the set of β values 0.4 to 0.9 because sacrifice only feasibly offers utility improvements 
for members when  β > α (see Iannaccone 1992). Operating within this subset is an 
assumption of the model justified by the simple intuition that a) agents’ dependence on 
the club good for utility is not such that they are crippled without it, and  b) that the value 
an agent receives from the club good is more dependent on the contributions of other 
members than her own personal contributions.
13
  
                                                 
10 These choices reflect the discussion in the previous sections. Results are robust to relatively small 
changes. Results remain the same with larger sets of groups (G), but testing is increasingly computationally 
burdensome.  
11 A Moore neighborhood is the eight spaces (agents) in the surrounding portion of the lattice. 
12 The selection of the top four groups (as opposed to three or five) is an arbitrary choice with the aim of 
being conservative in inclusion. The basic qualitative results are not sensitive to the range of groups 
selected.  
13 Values outside of this subset, while not outside of the realm of possibility, are unlikely. If β < 0, club 
influence over the agents reaches unrealistic levels - the arguments in the utility function, S and K, become 
multiplicative and denial of access to the club good reduces the agent’s utility to zero. In a Z-good 
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Figure 4 presents a collection of charts with the fraction of the population in 
extremist groups over μ, with each panel representing a different value of β. Extremist 
groups are not viable when substitutability between club goods and private goods is 
insufficiently strong ( 0.5  ). Below the β threshold, the relative weaker substitutability 
of goods makes the specialization in the club good required by extreme groups 
suboptimal for all agents across the full range of μ tested. Extremists as a percent of the 
population are always declining with the mean full income of the population, regardless 
of substitutability. Using the same data, Figure 5 presents a collection of charts with β as 
the independent variable, with each panel representing a different value of μ. For every 
value of μ charted, the fraction of the population joining extremist groups is increasing, at 
a decreasing rate, with β.  
 
[FIGURE 4] 
 
[FIGURE 5] 
 
Quantile Regression Modeling of Generated Data 
Quantile regression is generally presented as a tool for dealing with issues of 
robustness rather than theory (Koenker and Bassett 1978). Hamermesh (2000), however, 
eloquently points out that while quantile regression is advisable under conditions when 
                                                                                                                                                 
structured model with sufficient complementarity of arguments in the utility function, being denied any one 
Z-good is equivalent to a death sentence or rational suicide (Levy 1982). Values of β in the intermediate 
range 0 < β < α are unlikely as well; rising values of α correspond to increased output elasticity of the K to 
the individual’s inputs and decreasing importance of the group’s. Marginalizing the role of other members 
in the club good is antithetical to the concept of a religious congregational good. 
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the mean may not be a robust estimator, it can also be an effective tool for modeling data 
where economic theory makes different predictions for distinct quantiles of the 
distribution of the dependent variable (see also Buchinsky 1998; Koenker and Hallock 
2001; Levin 2001).
14
 Any theoretical model employing interacting heterogeneous agents 
promises the possibility of differential responses to model parameters across subsets of 
agents. Agent decisions are dependent on the interactions of other agents. This 
complexity invites the possibility of varied responses. Further, the model is motivated, in 
part, by the limitations of representative agent constructs when dealing with a subject, 
such as religious extremism, where the critical agents are not those from the middle of the 
population distribution, but those found in the tails. Given this complexity, and our 
analysis of the representative agent model in Section II (see Figure 2), we hypothesize 
that individuals distinguished by their large religious commitments (the upper quantiles 
of the commitment distribution) will respond to their institutional settings differently than 
their moderate counterparts. Regression analysis of the conditional quantiles is ideal for 
testing this hypothesis. Contrary to more common analysis of empirical data, the merits 
of regression analysis of simulation generated data are not in uncovering which tested 
factors matter (given the simple theoretical construct, we would expect any varied 
parameter to be statistically significant). Rather, regressions of the simulation data offer a 
better understanding of the magnitude and shape of how the outcome variables respond to 
parameters across the differing conditional quantiles. Further, results can be compared to 
similar quantile regression models of related empirical data. Quantile regression, as 
                                                 
14 "Useful features of the quantile regression and censored quantile regression models can be summarized 
as follows: ......, (e) potentially different solutions at distinct quantiles may be interpreted as differences in 
the response of the dependent variable to the changes in the regressors at various points in the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable; ....." page 89, Buchinsky (1998).  
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opposed to standard OLS, is particularly useful in this context given the use of a 
distribution of heterogeneous agents choosing from a distribution of heterogeneous 
groups, as well as our specific interest in understanding what distinguishes the “extreme” 
tail of the distribution. 
Data was generated from 500 runs of the model, each for 100 turns, with mean 
population full income [8, 64] and substitutability [0.4, 0.98] pulled from random 
uniform distributions. The generated data is analyzed with the log-log conditional 
quantile regression model: 
[4] 
i 0 1 2 i
i
log fracFI log log Full Income
 Quant (log fracFI )
 
with i ix x
  
 
    

   

 
 
where fracFIi  /R i S i R iR S R    , the fraction of full income dedicated to club 
production by agent i.  
To restate, we are testing how the conditional quantiles of fracFIi respond to 
changes in the simulation variables, substitutability (β) and full income (µ). Table 1 
shows the regressor coefficients for the 30% through 95% conditional quantiles of 
fracFIi, as well as the corresponding OLS results. Figure 6 presents the coefficients for 
the substitutability regressor in smaller increments. In Table 1 and Figure 6 we can see 
that fracFIi is decreasing with substitutability (β) in the lower quantiles, but increasing 
with substitutability after the 80% conditional quantile. The more moderately committed 
agents in a population will contribute more to their groups when they can offer a weak 
complement. The most committed members of a population (extremists, if you will) 
respond in the opposite manner, contributing more to their groups when they can offer a 
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strong substitute for private production. The changing of the coefficient from negative to 
positive is an example of a population dynamic that likely would go unnoticed with 
traditional OLS analysis, which reports only a positive coefficient (Table 1, column 1), an 
example of the merits of analyzing the conditional quantiles of data generated by multi-
agent models. The coefficient of full income is negative across all quantiles; increasing 
opportunity cost of time uniformly decreases dedication of resources to time-intensive 
club production.  
 
[TABLE 1] 
[FIGURE 6] 
 
The mechanics of this outcome are derivative of two structural elements of the 
model: utility production with two inputs and agent wage heterogeneity. Crudely put, in a 
two-input model, greater substitutability allows for greater specialization in a single 
input, which is exactly what an extremist group demands (see Figure 2, AS = 0.1).  
Complementarity, conversely, rewards utility production using a more even mixture of 
inputs and makes severe free riding less attractive. Such conditions are more conducive to 
moderate groups, within which agents can more efficiently pursue both club and secular 
endeavors (see Figure 2, AS = 0.9).  
The relevance of agent heterogeneity in this context is a bit more complicated and 
relates to the previous point regarding specialization. Heterogeneity exacerbates the free 
rider problem when substitutability is high. The more troublesome the free rider problem, 
the more attractive extremist groups will be.  Conversely, when substitutability is weak, 
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heterogeneity softens the free rider problem, which allows moderate groups to thrive. In a 
heterogeneous population, agents who earn lower wages place a greater fraction of their 
productive capacity into time intensive religious endeavors from which other group 
members benefit. As such, every agent has incentive to find a group whose members are 
relatively poorer than she is. High wage agents will always want low wage agents in their 
clubs because their specialization in time intensive activities add to the quality of club 
goods they benefit from. Lower wage agents, however, will be wary of having the quality 
of the club good weakened by free riding high wage agents. Moderate sacrifice 
requirements commit high wage agents to a level of club contribution sufficient to make 
the group attractive to low wage agents. As substitutability increases, high wage agents 
will find moderate sacrifice less attractive, and move towards zero sacrifice groups within 
which they can specialize in private (secular) production. At the same time, lower wage 
earners will have greater incentive to move towards extremist groups whose higher 
sacrifice requirements will screen out higher wage agents likely to free ride. 
Substitutability effectively cleaves the population. Greater substitutability will push 
moderate groups towards less club production, and extreme groups towards more club 
production (see Figure 6).  
As β decreases, the substitutability of the two goods weakens and their 
complementarity strengthens. The minimum amount of club production by the high wage 
agent increases as the efficient production of utility is dependent on increasingly more 
equitable amounts of its two “Z-good” inputs. The high wage agent stands to gain more 
from the inclusion of club good in her utility production as the complementarity of Si and 
Ki increases. As a result, the marginal reward to the poorer individual’s contribution is 
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less burdened by the free riding of wealthier members as β decreases. Weaker 
substitutability makes high wage agents more amenable to club production and low wage 
agents more amenable to lower sacrifice requirements, both of which lead to greater 
commitment in non-extremist groups.  
Further, in a heterogeneous population, higher wage agents have greater financial 
resources and equivalent time resources to lower wage agents, giving them an absolute 
advantage in productive capacity. When religious and secular utility inputs are 
sufficiently complementary, lower sacrifice groups can become attractive to lower wage 
agents who seek to benefit from the absolute productive advantage enjoyed by higher 
wage co-members. Whereas heterogeneity encouraged high wage agents to free ride 
when inputs were strong substitutes, increasing the appeal of extremism, when they are 
weak complements heterogeneity instead encourages low wage agents to seek out 
moderate groups attractive to high wage agents.  
 
IV Application: Testing Proposed Policy 
“…the policy implication of this analysis is that an efficient 
economy and a secular state providing public goods both weaken 
religious sects as members become less desperate for the economic 
services these sects provide.” – Eli Berman, Hamas, Taliban and the 
Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious 
Militias (2004) 
 
 There is within Iannaccone’s and Berman’s work the implicit and explicit policy 
proposition that goods competitive with the club goods provided by extremist groups 
should be subsidized or protected in an effort to reduce the attractiveness of these groups 
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to existing and prospective members. Berman (2004), via Munson (2001), tells the story 
of President Nasser’s nationalization of the Muslim Brotherhood’s social welfare network 
in Egypt, and the subsequent decline in both terrorist and non-violent activity by the 
Brotherhood. Such stories portend well for the potential effectiveness of targeted public 
goods policies. We adapt the model to test this proposition. Agents continue to produce 
their utility with inputs of private and club goods. The club good, however, is now 
supplemented with an impure public good that is available to all members of the 
population at zero price, but is subject to the sacrifice requirements of the group.
15
 This 
good is publicly provided such that no agent is excluded, and acts (for the sake of our 
argument) as an input to the club good portion of agent utility production, but can be 
reduced in consumable quantity by an agent’s club sacrifice requirements. A possible real 
world example would be a public school system. School systems are a good example 
because they are often a bundle of goods that include not just educational instruction, but 
also access to a variety of social networks for students and families. Religious clubs often 
offer members access to club schools that are very attractive to prospective members. A 
government could provide a competing school system, offering a similar bundle of 
human and social capital goods. Clubs with high sacrifice requirements, in turn, could 
limit access to this good through a variety of sacrifice and stigma requirements, including 
alternative holidays, required prayer times, manner of dress, gender limitations, exclusion 
of reading materials, and limits to social interaction.
16
  In this exercise we augment the 
                                                 
15 While the good is costlessly accessibly to all agents, it is impurely-public because the club is able to 
partially exclude its members from its consumption through sacrifice requirements.  
16 Of course prohibiting attendance of public schools would approach 100% sacrifice of this publicly 
provided good.  
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club good 
,i gQ  with an additional argument Ω that is subject to the group sacrifice rate, 1 
- AS.  
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[FIGURE 7] 
 
Results reported in Figure 7 support the policy proposition. Increasing provision 
of a public good Ω reduces the appeal of extremist groups to prospective members. 
Agents who were previously a part of the extremist tail of the distribution have shifted to 
relatively moderate groups. Further, there is no increase in the most moderate portion of 
the distribution – the public good provision has not reduced the appeal of all sacrifice 
requiring groups, only the most extreme.  
 Whether the new public good in the model, Ω, reduces the attractiveness of 
extremist groups to potential members is dependent on whether it is subject to group 
sacrifice. If group members have equal access to the public good, regardless of sacrifice 
level (i.e. if AS is dropped out of Equation 6), then there is no impact on the distribution 
of groups. Without sacrifice of public good Ω, Figure 7 remains unchanged from panel 0 
as Ω is increased. If the public good is subject to group sacrifice, then there exists both an 
income effect and a substitution effect between the private and club goods as Ω 
increased. Offering to individuals a public good at zero price that is not subject to the 
group sacrifice affects individual decision-making only through a potential income effect, 
changing the absolute wealth of all agents uniformly, but not changing the shadow prices 
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of private and club production. The observed income effect in these simulations is 
approximating zero. The substitution effect, derivative of a higher opportunity cost of 
membership, drives the resulting shift away from extremism in the population. This 
suggests that policies of general aid to the population to increase wealth, while possibly 
valuable in any number of ways, are less likely to reduce the appeal of extremism.  
The necessity of public good subjection to group sacrifice is not, necessarily, 
detrimental to the aims of the policy; it may even enhance the effect. Extreme groups are 
more likely to inhibit member access to the public good. Further, extremist groups who 
are violent in nature are likely to self-select from accessing the good, as their reputation 
for violence will make entering the public sphere a potentially high cost endeavor. It is 
feasible that offering public goods similar in nature to the club goods produced by 
religious extremists will disproportionally reduce the attractiveness of criminal groups, 
leaving peaceful, law-abiding extremist groups less affected. The exact nature of the 
public good is indeterminate in this analysis, but candidates would likely resemble those 
offered by groups such as Hamas, which include schools, orphanages, mosques, 
healthcare clinics, soup kitchens, and even sports leagues (Levitt 2004). 
 
V Data on Religious Commitment 
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) find that terrorists from a country positively 
correlate with deteriorating civil liberties and that when civil liberties are controlled for, 
the relative wealth of the country and its literacy rate have no statistically significant 
effect. These results run counter to the conventional wisdom that poverty and ignorance 
are the root causes of terrorism. There has not been much in the way of theory to explain 
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why weak civil liberties would be an important input into terrorist production (or, 
similarly, why strong civil liberties would be an obstacle to terrorist production). Civil 
liberties signal the existence of strong and healthy political and social institutions, 
particularly those relating to the ability of individuals to interact and congregate in 
meaningful associations. In countries with strong civil liberties we would expect private 
associations more numerous and robust, the marketplace more likely to thrive, and the 
state less coercive and more trustworthy as a provider of public goods. One possible 
explanation of the impact of civil liberties is that terrorists organized as an extremist 
religious group can offer a stronger substitute for secular alternatives when and where 
civil liberties are weak. As they are able to offer a stronger substitute, they will be able to 
recruit more members and induce greater commitment on behalf of their membership. If 
such a mechanism were at work, then it should be observable not just in the violent 
manifestations of extremist groups, but in the religious commitment of populations which 
would, across their quantiles, correlate to civil liberties similar to what is observed in our 
model. Further, as we go to the higher quantiles of religious commitment, we would 
expect a sign switch, with the most committed people increasing in commitment with 
weaker civil liberties.  
Similar arguments can be made regarding related institutional conditions and the 
substitutability of religious club goods for secular goods. The rational group will only 
position its club good as a substitute if it can hope to compete with the amalgamated offer 
of all other goods. If the public sector offers equivalent goods at a lower price, the group 
will be more attractive to prospective members if it structures, and markets, its club good 
as more of a complement. As the marketplace grows in size, so does the variety of goods 
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it offers. The group may still desire to position itself as a substitute, but it simply cannot 
produce such a good internally – the group is limited by its internal division of labor. 
Healthy markets institutions effectively cap the degree of substitutability a club good can 
achieve. Similarly, effective government can provide public goods with a reach and scale 
difficult for any group, again limited by its size and internal division of labor, for which 
to provide substitutes. Under such circumstances, citizens are less likely to look to club 
goods for substitutes, and more likely to look to them for complements, for the goods and 
services they procure independently. This logic implies that substitutability of club goods 
for non-club goods will decrease as market and government institutions get stronger.  We 
hypothesize that the distribution of individual religious commitment will correlate to 
institutional indices in a manner analogous to the correlation between religious club 
commitment and substitutability in the theoretical model. We predict that moderate 
religious commitment will grow when social institutions are strong, while, as said earlier, 
more extreme commitment will grow when social institutions are weak.  
To test our predictions, we construct a quantile regression model of survey data 
from the 1998 International Social Survey Program (Religion II), which included 
questions regarding respondent time commitments to religious activities and their yearly 
earnings. Sufficient data was available from 25,806 respondents from thirty countries.
17
 
We model the relationship between religious time commitment and institutions with the 
following conditional quantile specification:  
                                                 
17 The data used here are a summation of respondent choices from a set of cardinal values. The resulting 
measure of time commitment to his or her religious group has 216 possible outcomes. The largest time 
commitment attributable to an individual by our summation is 323 hours. Unfortunately, we are unable to 
more finely distinguish individuals at the highest level of commitment in the sample. 
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ijz  is the log of hours dedicated to religious group activity in the last year by 
respondent i from country j. Institutions includes the civil liberties index (as reported by 
Freedom House), economic freedom index (as reported by The Heritage Foundation), and 
the World Bank’s government effectiveness indicator (Kaufmann et al. 2005) for country 
j. We use all three indices here in reverse scales: increasing values report deteriorating 
institutions. Earnings is the individual earnings for the previous year reported by 
respondent i. The role of religious regulation has been established empirically (Grim and 
Finke 2006) and theoretically (Barros and Garoupa 2002). All specifications include the 
index of religious regulation controls, RR, in country j, constructed by Grim and Finke 
(2006) The data used is summarized in Table 2.
18
 A table of countries and institutional 
indices are included as an appendix. To account issues of robustness and correlation 
across observations within countries, we bootstrap the regressions to allow standard error 
clustering by country.  
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
                                                 
18 To avoid exclusion of zero religious time observations, an “approximate log” transformation was used, 
adding ε =1 to the values of religious time. Box-Cox estimation of all three specification variations yield a 
lambda = 0.01.The qualitative results of the analysis remain the same with ε = 0.001. Retaining the original 
values and estimating the level-log produced coefficients with identical signs. For a discussion of the 
potential bias involved with approximate log estimates, see Ehrlich and Liu (1999).  
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  The coefficients of the institutional and income survey variable quantiles are 
reported in Table 3. Figure 8 presents the coefficients for the civil liberties regressor in 
smaller increments, as well as the 95% confidence interval.  Limitations on the range of 
countries and number of individuals surveyed resulted in data that is likely under-
representative of individual religious commitment in the upper range. As such, the 
individual quantiles should not be interpreted as corresponding to the identical quantile 
from the simulation data. Rather, we are looking for corresponding negative coefficients 
at the lower ranges of religious commitment and similar transitional effects as we move 
to higher quantiles.
19
 While there are positive correlations between civil liberties, 
economic freedom, and government effectiveness, they remain sufficiently different to 
test them together.  
Religious time commitment decreases with deteriorating civil liberties in the 
lower quantiles, and transitions to a positive response to deteriorating liberties in the 
upper quantiles (Figure 8, Table 3). The coefficient on civil liberties becomes larger with 
each higher quantile, moving from -0.973 (10% quantile) to 0.128 (95% quantile). The 
civil liberties index is the only variable that switches directions in its impact on religious 
commitment across quantiles. Most coefficients are not statistically significant at the 5% 
level, though the 95% confidence intervals are shrinking as we move up to the higher 
conditional quantiles.  
Religious time commitment is decreasing with reduced economic freedom across 
all quantiles. The magnitude of the negative response to reduced economic freedom in the 
data is U-shaped, with largest reduction in religious time commitment correlated to 
                                                 
19 Given the simplicity of the model, that the quantiles do transition at similar points cannot be interpreted 
as more than coincidence at this point. 
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weaker economic freedom in the middle quantiles, and relatively smaller correlations in 
the higher and lower quantiles. A transition to a positive effect is not observed. 
It is possible that civil liberties act as a proxy for the quality of government 
provided public goods, whereby governments with poor public goods must resort to 
coercion to engender legitimacy. This might explain why extremist groups would thrive 
when government services qua civil liberties are weak, though it does not explain why 
moderate groups enjoy greater member commitment when civil liberties are strong. We 
address this by including the World Bank’s indicator of government effectiveness. This 
indicator serves to measure the quality of public goods produced by government and the 
efficiency with which it produces them. Hungerman finds evidence that government and 
churches are substitutes (Hungerman 2005). Supporting the church as government 
substitute hypothesis and Hungerman’s results, we find that religious time commitment is 
here increasing with weakening government effectiveness across all of the quantiles.  
Religious time commitment is declining with earnings in every specification, 
across every quantile. The absolute magnitudes of the coefficients, however, are 
shrinking at the higher quantiles, indicating the religious time commitments of the most 
religiously committed individuals are less sensitive to their earnings than their more 
moderate counterparts. This is possibly because members of moderate groups tend to 
have higher incomes, and in turn, higher opportunity costs of time, and are more likely to 
substitute financial contributions for donations of time as their incomes rise. Religious 
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time commitment is decreasing with religious regulation across all quantiles and 
specifications.
20
    
 
[TABLE 3] 
[FIGURE 8] 
 
VI Discussion  
The model is of groups that are neither necessarily religious nor militant. Groups that 
place large demands of sacrifice upon its members have been identified as “extremist.” 
These groups are defined by internal mechanisms for member incentive alignment that 
are congruent with terrorist tactics, and are relevant to discussion of the characteristics 
that underpin potential hotbeds of militancy. Extremist groups decrease in size in the 
model as wages rise; it is possible for wages in the simulated population to reach a level 
wherein extremism is no longer appealing to anyone. The impact of poverty, however, is 
dependent on the substitutability of the club produced Z-good for the privately produced 
Z-good; strong substitutability is (weakly) sufficient for the viability of extremism 
(within a reasonable range of wage distributions). Pure income effects, such as a windfall 
gain or universally received lump sum aid, have no effect on the extremism profile of a 
population in the model.  
The correlation of upper tail of the commitment distribution in the ISSP survey to 
civil liberties offers a mechanism to underpin and clarify Krueger and Maleckova’s 
                                                 
20 The theoretical model reports religious commitment universally decreasing with wages, but the similar 
result found in the survey is potentially an artifact of high wage individuals substituting money for time. 
The 1998 ISSP data does not report financial contributions; substitution of money for time is unseen. 
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finding of terrorist origination increasing with the deterioration of civil liberties. Terrorist 
groups, even if not explicitly organized as an extremist religious group, use similar 
sacrifice mechanisms, and we can expect them to respond to institutional conditions in a 
manner similar to extremist religion. Further, the corresponding patterns of changing 
coefficients across quantiles for the substitutability variable in the simulation data and the 
civil liberties variable in the survey data offer up a potential theoretical mechanism by 
which civil liberties impacts terrorist organizations. If we interpret civil liberties as a 
proxy for increased prevalence and accessibility of well-working social institutions, then 
we can equate improving institutions with reducing the prospects of a group to offer a 
strong substitute for the state and private marketplace. Controlling for  civil liberties, 
economic freedom, and government effectiveness, only civil liberties exhibits the 
changing of correlation from negative to positive across the distribution similar to that 
observed with substitutability in the simulation model. This is suggestive of the 
importance of factors unique to civil liberties (versus those overlapping with economic 
freedom and government effectiveness), such as assembly, association, and social 
networks. Extremist groups requiring high sacrifice are more attractive when more 
mundane, moderate groups are prohibitively difficult to organize, something we would 
expect under conditions of weak civil liberties. The degraded quality of standard social 
goods under conditions of weak civil liberties lowers the bar for extremist groups in their 
efforts to offer a club good as a strong substitute for outside offerings. 
  The across the board empirical and theoretical findings of religious commitment 
decreasing with earnings appears an elementary case of individuals facing rising 
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opportunity cost of time, where club production is more time intensive than private 
production. 
 
VII Conclusions 
 
We find that religious commitment generally, and religious extremism in particular, 
correlates to civil liberties empirically in a manner similar to how commitment correlates 
to substitutability of club goods and private goods theoretically. Given that religious 
extremism is a frequent, and important, input into terrorism, this suggests a mechanism 
behind the Krueger and Maleckova (2003) results linking terrorist origination to weak 
civil liberties that relates to the organizing of such groups as religious clubs  and the use 
of sacrifice and stigma to engender commitment. 
 The policy proposition for public goods to undermine extremist groups is found 
promising, so long as access to the public good is subject to group sacrifice requirements. 
This caveat is unlikely to be violated, however, in light of groups’ underlying incentives 
to use sacrifice to screen out free riders. Further, barriers to goods provided through 
governments, aid organizations, and the marketplace are likely the strongest for groups 
operating outside the law. Members of groups associated with violence have strong 
incentives to maintain a closed network of social interactions. The most difficult hurdle to 
effective policy under these conditions would not appear to be diligence in supervision of 
public good provision, but rather the supporting of public goods and markets that directly 
compete with the club goods extremist organizations produce to attract members.  
 
 35 
References 
 
Barros, P. P. and N. Garoupa (2002). "An Economic Theory of Church Strictness." The 
Economic Journal 112( ): 481-559. 
Becker, G. S. (1965). "A Theory of the Allocation of Time." The Economic Journal 
75(299): 493-517. 
Berman, E. (2000). "Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice:  An Economist's View of Ultra-
Orthodox Jews." Quarterly Journal of Economics 65(3): 905-953. 
Berman, E. (2004). "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View 
of Radical Religious Militias." NBER Working Papers(No. w10004). 
Bromley, D. G. and J. G. Melton (2002). Cults, religion, and violence. New York, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Buchanan, J. M. (1965). "An Economic Theory of Clubs." Economica 32(125): 1-14. 
Buchinsky, M. (1998). "Recent Advances in Quantile Regression Models: A Practical 
Guideline for Empirical Research." The Journal of Human Resources 33(1): 88-
126. 
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler (1986). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club 
Goods. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Dragulescu, A. A. and V. M. Yakovenko (2001). "Evidence for the exponential 
distribution of income in the USA." The European Physical Journal 20: 585-589. 
Ehrlich, I. and Z. Liu (1999). "Sensitivity Analyses of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let's 
Keep the Econ in Econometrics." Journal of Law and Economics 42(1, Part 2, 
Penalties: Public and Private: A Conference Sponsored in Part by the John M. 
Olin Program in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law School 
and the George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State at the 
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business): 455-487. 
Grim, B. J. and R. Finke (2006). "International Religion Indexes: Government 
Regulation, Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion." 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 2. 
Gruber, J. and D. M. Hungerman (2006). "The Church vs. The Mall: What Happens 
When Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 123(2): 831-862. 
Hamermesh, D. S. (2000). "The Craft of Labormetrics." Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 53(3): 363-380. 
Hungerman, D. M. (2005). "Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 
Welfare Reform." Journal of Public Economics 89(11-12): 2245-2267. 
Iannaccone, L. and E. Berman (2006). "Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Deadly." Public Choice 128(1-2): 109-129. 
Iannaccone, L. R. (1992). "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, 
Communes, and Other Collectives." Journal of Political Economy 100(2): 271-
291. 
Iannaccone, L. R. (1997). "Toward an Economic Theory of 'Fundamentalism'." Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153(1): 100-116. 
Iannaccone, L. R. (1999). "Religious Extremism: Origins and Consequences." 
Contemporary Jewry 20: 8-29. 
 36 
Jones, A. F. and D. H. Weinberg (2000). The Changing Shape of the Nation's Income 
Distribution. E. a. S. Administration. Washington, D.C., U.S Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
Juergensmeyer, M. (2001). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, et al. (2005). Governance matters IV: governance indicators for 
1996-2004, The World Bank. 
Koenker, R. and G. Bassett, Jr. (1978). "Regression Quantiles." Econometrica 46(1): 33-
50. 
Koenker, R. and K. F. Hallock (2001). "Quantile Regression." The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 15(4): 143-156. 
Krueger, A. B. (2007). What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, 
Princeton University Press. 
Krueger, A. B. and J. Maleckova (2003). "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a 
Causal Connection?" The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4): 119-144. 
Levin, J. (2001). "For whom the reductions count: A quantile regression analysis of class 
size and peer effects on scholastic achievement." Empirical Economics 26(1): 
221-246. 
Levitt, M. (2004). "Hamas from Cradle to Grave." Middle East Quarterly: 3-15. 
Levy, D. (1982). "Diamonds, Water, and Z goods: an Account of the Paradox of Value." 
History of Political Economy 14(3). 
Luke, S., C. Cioffi-Revilla, et al. (2005). "MASON: A Multiagent Simulation 
Environment." SIMULATION 81(7): 517. 
Majumder, A. and S. R. Chakravarty (1990). "Distribution of Personal Income: 
Development of a new Model and its Application to U. S. Income Data." Journal 
of Applied Econometrics 5(2): 189-196. 
Marty, M. E. and R. S. Appleby (1995). The fundamentalism project, University of 
Chicago Press. 
McDonald, J. B. and M. R. Ransom (1979). "Functional Forms, Estimation Techniques 
and the Distribution of Income." Econometrica 47(6): 1513-1526. 
Munson, Z. (2001). "Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood." 
The Sociological Quarterly 42(4): 487-510. 
Press, W. H. (2002). Numerical recipes in C++ : the art of scientific computing. New 
York, Cambridge University Press. 
Stark, R. and W. S. Bainbridge (1985). The Future of Religion. Berkeley, University of 
California Press. 
Stark, R. and R. Finke (2000). Acts of Faith:  Explaining the Human Side of Religion. 
Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Stern, J. (2003). Terror in the name of God: why religious militants kill. New York, Ecco. 
Stigler, G. J. and G. S. Becker (1977). "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum." The 
American Economic Review 67(2): 76-90. 
Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. Lanham, 
Md., Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
 
 37 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium Agent Utility over AS in the representative agent model. Outcomes 
for three different values of β (0.6, 0.75, and 0.9) are shown.  
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Figure 2. Equilibrium fraction of full income dedicated to the religious club (R
e 
/ I) over 
substitutability (β) in the representative agent model. Outcomes for two different values of 
AS (0.9, 0.1) are shown.  
 
 
 39 
 
Figure 3. 33 by 33 lattice 
 
 
Figure 4. Extremist groups as a percent of the population over mean full income (μ) with 
substitutability (β), varying across panels. The value above each panel is the substitutability 
parameter (β) for the set of simulation runs graphed within the panel. Mean full income μ 
varies along the x axis within each panel. Extremist group members, as a percent of the 
simulated population, is measured on the y axis.  
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Figure 5. Extremist groups as a percent of the population over substitutability (β), with 
mean fill incomes varying across panels. The value above each panel is the mean full income 
of the wage distribution for the set of simulation runs within the panel. β varies along the x 
axis within each panel. Extremist group members, as a percent of the simulated population, 
is measured on the y axis.  
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Figure 6 Quantile Regression Coefficients between 30% and 99% quantiles in increments of 
5% (99% charted instead of 100%), simulation generated data. Conditional quantiles: Log 
Full Income Dedicated to Club Production. Regressor: Log Substitutability. 
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Figure 7 Log Group membership, graphed by public good Ω (indexed in the upper right 
corner).  Group ID # m, and in turn the amount of sacrifice required by the group, is 
increasing as we move to the right on the horizontal axis, with each bar representing a 
different group. The vertical axis measures log(ng). The groups labeled “extreme” have been 
color-coded shades of red. The quantity of of public good Ω made available is increasing as 
we move down the charts. At the highest amount of Ω available extreme sacrifice groups 
fail to recruit members.  
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Figure 8  Regression Coefficients between 30% and 99% in increments of 5% (99% charted 
instead of 100%), 1998 ISSP Religious commitment data. Conditional quantiles: Log 
Religion Time. Regressor: Log Civil Liberties. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Quantile Regression Estimates: Fraction Log Full Income Dedicated to Club 
Production 
    Quantile   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
         
Log Substitutability (β) -4.483 
(0.011) 
-7.243 
(0.016) 
-5.796 
(0.010) 
-4.694 
(0.007) 
-3.292 
(0.010) 
-1.081 
(0.013) 
0.867 
(0.011) 
1.690 
(0.007) 
Log Mean Full Income 
(μ) 
-1.499 
(0.003) 
-0.880 
(0.003) 
-0.994 
(0.002) 
-1.005 
(0.002) 
-1.213 
(0.002) 
-1.309 
(0.003) 
-1.035 
(0.002) 
-0.782 
(0.001) 
Constant -0.933 
(0.009) 
-5.140 
(0.010) 
-3.487 
(0.007) 
-2.554 
(0.006) 
-0.836 
(0.009) 
1.192 
(0.013) 
1.949 
(0.010) 
2.048 
(0.006) 
N = 544,500. SE in parentheses. All coefficients significant at 0.1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics, Survey and Institutions 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Religious Time† 37.65 54.26 
Earnings† 13,963 16125 
Civil Liberties ŧ 1.71 0.73 
Economic Freedom§ 33.41 9.31 
Government Effectiveness‡ 1.70 0.87 
Religious Regulation‡‡ 1.78 2.12 
N=25,806 observations † International Social Survey Programme 1998: Religion II (ISSP 1998), 
Yearly earnings reported in the data set as median values from survey ranges unique to each 
country and converted to 1998 dollars. Religious hours per hour are a sum of intermediate values 
from three different survey questions, ŧ  Freedom House (2005): Scale 1-7, low is better civil 
liberties, § Heritage Foundation (2005): Scale 0-100, rounded to nearest 1.0, low is more freedom 
(reversed from original data), ‡World Bank’s government effectiveness indicator (Kaufmann et 
al. 2005), low is more effective (reversed from original scale). ‡‡ Grim and Finke (2006) and The 
Association of Religion Data Archives 2005, Scale 0 to 10, increasing with the level of 
regulation. 
  
Table 3. Quantile Regression Dependent Variable: Log Religion Time* 
    Quantile 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 99% 
           
Log Civil 
Liberties 
-0.498   
(0.332) 
-1.477* 
(0.671) 
-1.550 
(0.847) 
-0.994 
(0.863) 
-0.563 
(0.631) 
-0.162 
(0.396) 
-0.044 
(0.153) 
0.110 
(0.154) 
0.155 
(0.167) 
0.138 
(0.199) 
Log Econ. 
Freedom 
-.824   
(0.489) 
-0.146 
(0.929) 
-0.552 
(1.215) 
-1.933 
(1.288) 
-1.900 
(1.086) 
-0.699 
(0.803) 
-0.343 
(0.296) 
-0.863* 
(0.374) 
-0.426 
(0.368) 
-0.210 
(0.384) 
Log Govt. Effect. 
0.538   
(0.272) 
0.895 
(0.428)* 
1.053 
(0.660) 
1.600* 
(0.747) 
1.249 
(0.755) 
0.253 
(0.601) 
0.090 
(0.129) 
0.260 
(0.194) 
0.139 
(0.139) 
0.128 
(0.183) 
Log Earnings 
-0.196   
(0.050) 
-0.171 
(0.110) 
-0.388** 
(0.133) 
-0.296** 
(0.114) 
-0.237* 
(0.120) 
-0.093 
(0.094) 
-0.027 
(0.032) 
-0.050 
(0.036) 
-0.032 
(0.035) 
-0.029 
(0.031) 
Log Religious 
Reg. 
-0.415  
(0.207) 
-0.497 
(0.400) 
-0.688 
(0.525) 
-0.889* 
(0.404) 
-0.677* 
(0.321) 
-0.191 
(0.308) 
-0.066 
(0.069) 
-0.269* 
(0.109) 
-0.424** 
(0.112) 
-0.361* 
(0.140) 
Constant 
7.312   
(1.667) 
3.691 
(3.529) 
7.843 
(4.414) 
12.304** 
(4.377) 
12.113** 
(3.724) 
7.331** 
(2.771) 
5.676** 
(1.132) 
8.045** 
(1.202) 
6.874** 
(1.245) 
6.662** 
(1.280) 
Civil Liberties, Economic Freedom, and Government Effectiveness on Reverse Scales (higher values = deteriorating institutions); N=25,806; SE 
in parentheses; *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Log Religion time = log (total hours + 1) to avoid truncation of data where time = 0. Log 
Religious Regulation = log (Religious regulation score + 1) to avoid truncation where RR score = 0.  
. 
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Appendix  
Table A. ISSP Survey Countries and relevant data 
Country 
Civil 
Liberties
ŧ
 
Economic 
Freedom
§
 
Religious 
Regulation
‡ 
Government 
Effectiveness
‡‡
 
Mean 
Earnings
†
 
Australia 1 24.16 1.56 1.15 23166.41 
Austria 1 30.52 1.0 1.45 14233.68 
Bulgaria 3 52.80 7.11 4.03 4235.39 
Canada 1 29.97 1.00 0.87 23818.67 
Chile 2 23.73 2.39 1.69 4175.28 
Cyprus 1 32.58 7.11 1.67 10052.43 
Czech Republic 2 31.10 1.00 2.31 2740.543 
Denmark 1 33.77 1.83 0.80 28604.17 
France 2 36.04 4.89 1.41 21874.49 
Germany 2 37.28 3.22 1.22 14289.01 
Hungary 2 41.19 8.5 2.24 1742.83 
Ireland 1 24.91 1.00 1.27 13597.83 
Israel / Palestine 3 36.29 3.22 2.08 15876.42 
Italy 2 35.58 3.22 2.01 12352.76 
Japan 2 28.85 4.06 1.95 26752.8 
Latvia 2 37.59 4.89 2.76 1795.25 
New Zealand 1 21.41 1.00 0.99 14740.86 
Norway 1 31.82 1.83 0.88 28192.3 
Philippines 3 36.17 1.83 2.87 1902.60 
Poland 2 38.67 1.00 2.16 3469.68 
Portugal 1 34.36 1.00 1.57 5302.43 
Russia 4 49.15 5.72 3.62 2065.11 
Slovak Republic 2 46.48 2.39 3.00 2160.68 
Slovenia 2 41.44 2.39 2.32 6140.623 
Spain 2 33.78 2.67 1.05 9597.53 
Sweden 1 33.29 1.00 1.01 24076.82 
Switzerland 1 21.77 1.00 0.52 37869.25 
United Kingdom 2 22.96 1.00 0.61 20065.3 
United States 1 23.18 1.00 1.29 15056.25 
N=25,806 observations † International Social Survey Programme 1998: Religion II (ISSP 1998), 
Yearly earnings reported in the data set as median values from survey ranges unique to each 
country and converted to 1998 dollars. Religious hours per hour are a sum of intermediate values 
from three different survey questions, ŧ  Freedom House (2005): Scale 1-7, low is better civil 
liberties, § Heritage Foundation (2005): Scale 0-100, rounded to nearest 1.0, low is more freedom 
(reversed from original data), ‡World Bank’s government effectiveness indicator (Kaufmann et 
al. 2005), low is more effective (reversed from original scale). ‡‡ Grim and Finke (2006) and The 
Association of Religion Data Archives 2005, Scale 0 to 10, increasing with the level of 
regulation. 
 
